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Abstract: We propose a certificate-based single sign-on mechanism in distributed systems.  The 
proposed security protocols and authentication mechanisms are integrated in a middleware.  The 
novelty of our middleware lies on the use of XPCOM components, this way we provide a 
different services that can be used on every platform where Mozilla is available. The component 
based architecture of the implemented services allows using the authentication components 
separately.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 In this paper we propose a single sign-on mechanism based on certificates 
generated on request for client applications. Single sign-on mechanisms ensure 
the use of user credentials for accessing multiple resources where the user is 
requested to enter its credentials only once. This ensures a reduction of the 
number of passwords used which can significantly improve security of systems 
by minimizing the likelihood of a password being compromised [1]. 
Communication between client applications and servers is done using secure 
channels based on security protocols. In order to minimize the overhead needed 
for accessing multiple servers, instead of using protocols such as SSL [2] or its 
more recent version TLS [3], we designed a set of new protocols based on 
Guttman’s authentication tests [4, 5]. The protocols have been implemented using 
the existing security library OpenSSL [6], which, together with the protocol 
descriptions, ensures the correct implementation of the designed protocols. 
 In order to provide a minimal effort for developing single sign-on 
mechanisms in distributed systems, we developed a middleware that 
implements the proposed security protocols and single sign-on mechanism. 
Existing single sign-on mechanisms are either implemented to function on a 
single platform, such as Active Directory [7] for Microsoft Windows or 
eDirectory [8] for Unix systems, or they rely on a centralized directory structure 
  
such as LDAP [9], to which servers must be connected in order to authenticate 
users. The novelty of our middleware lies on the use of XPCOM [10] 
components provided by the Mozilla platform to encapsulate the 
communication layer. This way, we do not only provide a single sign-on 
mechanism for a single platform, but a mechanism that can be used on every 
platform where Mozilla is available. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section we 
describe the architecture of the middleware: the requirements, the software 
stack and the security protocols.  
 
 
2. Middleware architecture 
 
2.1 Requirements 
 
 Network users typically maintain a set of authentication credentials 
(usually a username/password pair) with every Service Provider (SP) they are 
registered with. In the context of this paper a service provider is any entity that 
provides some kind of service or content to a user. Examples of SPs include 
web services, messenger services, FTP/web sites, and streaming media 
providers. The number of such SPs with which users usually interact has grown 
beyond the point at which most users can memorize the required credentials. 
The most common solution is for users to use the same password with every SP 
with which they register — a tradeoff between security and usability in favor of 
the latter. A solution for this security issue is Single Sign-On (SSO), a technique 
whereby the user authenticates him/herself only once and is automatically 
logged into SPs as necessary, without requiring further manual interaction [11].  
 There are several approaches to create a SSO network: The Kerberos based 
[12] systems initially prompt the user for credentials, emitting a Kerberos ticket-
granting ticket (TGT). Drawbacks to the Kerberos based system include the 
centralized architecture: when the Kerberos server is down, no one can log in. 
Kerberos requires the clocks of the involved hosts to be synchronized, the 
tickets have a time availability period, by default configuration 10 minutes, and 
if the host clock is not synchronized with the Kerberos server clock, the 
authentication will fail. Also, the secret keys for all users are stored on the 
central server, so a compromise of that server will compromise all users' secret 
keys. Another approach would be the smart card based authentication: an 
integrated circuit, which can process data, is embedded in a plastic card, which 
will be used to identify its owner. The necessity of this hardware, which can 
easily be physically damaged, stolen or compromised, excluded this method 
from our list. Some other possibilities include the use of one-time passwords 
(OTP) or the integrated windows authentication but for our model we have 
  
chosen a client certificate based configuration.  First of all, the X.509 
certificates we’re using are ITU-T standardized, which widens the possibilities 
of the implementations or further developing. These certificates are based on the 
RSA encryption algorithm, providing the necessary security needed. The 
certificates are relatively easily generated and due to their small size, their 
storage and transport over the network is also easy. The X.509 certificates store 
several predefined information about their owner, but can also contain custom 
data. We use these fields to store each client’s permissions in the network. An 
immediate disadvantage of such an approach is the support for a single 
encryption algorithm at a time. It was shown that the algorithm can be broken if 
there are enough resources used, but using larger keys (1024 or 2048 bit) makes 
this very hard, if not impossible, with existing technologies. Another drawback 
to RSA encryption is its processing power and execution time, compared to 
other algorithms, like: AES, 3DES, Blowfish or RC6. This is why we try to 
minimize its usage, and when possible, replace it with a more resource-friendly 
encryption algorithm.  
 Single sign-on mechanisms already exist, and they are widely used, like 
the mentioned Active Directory for Microsoft Windows or eDirectory for UNIX 
systems. However they are platform-specific. Our goal was to create a 
mechanism that runs on a wide variety of platforms, hence we have chosen 
XPCOM. It stands for Cross Platform Component Object Model, and it’s a 
framework for writing multi-platform, modular software. The core of the 
components is written using the NSPR (Netscape Portable Runtime [13]) 
libraries, as shown in Figure 1 [14]. As an application, it uses a set of core 
XPCOM libraries to selectively load and manipulate XPCOM components. It’s 
open source, and it supports just about any platform that hosts a C++ compiler, 
including: Microsoft Windows, Linux, HP-UX, AIX, Solaris, OpenVMS, 
MacOS, and BSD.  
  
  
 
Figure 1. Top Level Conceptual Architecture of Mozilla Application Suite 
 
 
2.2 Software Stack 
 
 The middleware structure has four layers, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Middleware structure 
 
2.2.1 NSPR 
 
 The NSPR layer of the middleware is implemented using of various 
classes and objects, such as threads, sockets, coders, parsers, timers, several 
data structures, and other implementations, which form the foundation of the 
whole platform. These components were written using the NSPR libraries. 
Netscape Portable Runtime (NSPR) provides platform independence for non-
GUI operating system facilities. These facilities include threads, thread 
  
synchronization, normal file and network I/O, interval timing and calendar time, 
basic memory management and shared library linking. The current 
implementation supports Macintosh (PPC), WIN-32 (WinNT, Win9x) and 20 
versions of UNIX and is still expanding.  
 
2.2.2 Communication Channels 
 
 The communication channels are built on top of the NSPR layer to create 
more advanced data transportation mechanisms. The channels are created 
dynamically and managed by channel handlers. They support custom, 
predefined structured messages, but also raw data.  
 
2.2.3 Single Sign-on 
 
 Single sign-on (SSO) is a mechanism whereby a single action of user 
authentication and authorization allows accessing to all computers and systems 
where authorization rights have been verified, without the need to enter multiple 
passwords. Single sign-on reduces human error, a major component of systems 
failure and is therefore highly desirable. 
 Our proposed system is composed of two types of participants: clients and 
servers. In Figure 3 we illustrated a simple network with 3 servers and two 
clients: one already connected and another who’s in the authentication process. 
The communication lines between the nodes may be unstable and in most of the 
cases unsafe, which exposes our messages to different threats like spoofing, 
replicating or simple message loss. We designed the system to prevent any of 
these attacks, and to be easy to implement and use. Each server can hosts many 
and different services, but for our model we only need an authentication service 
and a resource service. The services are of type request-response, and all the 
data sent is confidential. The authentication service provides two types of 
authentication mechanisms: the first one requires the use of a username and 
password, while the second one requires the use of the generated certificates. In 
order to gain access to a Service Provider (SP), a client first has to register at 
one server called the home server. Each server can be a home server and 
resource server at the same time; it’s only relative to the client. The registration 
can take any form, in our model we assume that there is a secure database, 
where every client is already registered. The requester contacts its home server, 
and sends him his credentials (Step 1 in Figure 3); this is the only time he has to 
manually log in. The home server will generate a certificate, containing user 
data (e.g. username, location, organization name, e-mail address), expiration 
date, but also information about the issuer, to verify its genuineness. The 
certificate also contains information about the user’s permissions, following a 
role-based access control (RBAC) model. Since users are not assigned 
  
permissions directly, but only acquire them through their role (or roles), 
management of individual user rights becomes a matter of simply assigning 
appropriate roles to the user. This simplifies common operations, such as adding 
a user, or changing a user's department. In Step 2 (Figure 3), the client receives 
the certificate. The next two steps, 3 and 4 in Figure 3 are to contact the desired 
SP, sending the certificate, and exchanging a session key, which will be used to 
encrypt data from now on. RSA encryption algorithms, which we used so far, 
require more processing power, so we will use the triple DES algorithm, with a 
new key each session to maximize security and performance. If the client wants 
to access a different SP, it just has to send the certificate, and a new session key 
will be generated. As long as the certificate isn’t expired, it can connect to every 
SP in the network, otherwise it will have to repeat the first step and obtain a 
new certificate. 
 
 
Figure 3. System setup 
 
 
2.3 Security Protocols 
 
 In the proposed middleware, there was a need for authentication protocols 
that satisfied security requirements, such as: confidentiality in an insecure 
environment, supporting message loss, certificate and key generation. We 
developed several security protocols, based on Guttman’s authentication tests. 
The implementation of these protocols was done using the OpenSSL security 
  
libraries. A combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic 
algorithms was used to achieve a balance between security and performance. 
The authentication consists of two phases: acquiring the certificate from the 
home server, and the second to authenticate at the resource server with the 
newly generated credentials. 
 In order to achieve a valid certificate and key, the client (A) needs to 
contact its home server (B). This is where the first phase of the authentication 
protocol takes place (Figure 4), initiated by the client who sends its username, 
requesting a connection. If the server finds the username in its database, and the 
system is capable of accepting a new connection, it generates a 1024 bit length 
nonce (N, random). A hash function (h) is applied on this nonce, and is sent to 
the client, together with a message informing the other participant that it can 
continue with the next step. Then, the client sends its username and password, 
and a single secret key is generated (KAB) used to encrypt the next message 
from the server. The received hash of the nonce is hashed again, and together 
with the username, password and the generated symmetric key, are encrypted 
using the server’s public key (pkB). Upon receiving the data from the client, the 
server hashes the nonce once again and compares it to the previously saved 
data. If they match, meaning the message is fresh, it verifies the username and 
password and a new certificate will be generated, along with the RSA inverse 
keys. The secret key (skA) will be encrypted with the key received from the 
client. The keys, the certificate and the nonce are digitally signed, and sent back 
to the client. This will verify the nonce and the signature, and if everything is 
valid, the certificate and the secret key are decoded and decrypted, finalizing the 
first phase of the authentication.  
 The second phase of the authentication, which you can see in Figure 4, 
starts after acquiring a certificate. The client contacts the desired resource 
server, communicating his intentions on getting access to the resources. If the 
server is willing to accept new connections, it will generate and send a 1024 bit 
nonce (N), informing the client about the connection being accepted. Receiving 
this message, the client hashes and signs the received nonce with his own 
private key (skA), and attaches the certificate to the message. The server can 
verify the signed nonce with the received certificate, but this certificate will also 
be verified to ensure it was emitted by a trusted authority, in this case, the 
client’s home server. If no problems occur, the server proceeds to generate a 
session key (KAB), which will be used for further data encryption. This key and 
the nonce will be encrypted with the client’s public key (pkA), and also signed 
by the server, to protect its contents. The whole message is encrypted again with 
the server’s public key, to prevent any modifications on the data. 
  
 
Figure 4. Authentication protocol 
 
 
3. Experimental Results 
 
 The tests were performed on a Microsoft Windows machine, 2800 Mhz 
dual core CPU. As you can see in Figure 6, the RSA key generations use the 
most resources. When the number of clients is lower then 10, the delay could 
vary between 50 to 500 milliseconds, but if more than 10 clients try to request 
certificates simultaneously, the waiting time can go over 1-2 seconds, as you 
can see in Figure 7. This wouldn’t be a problem, but in a populated network, we 
can’t limit the number of clients to 10, there could be hundreds of even 
thousands of requests at the same time, and could create a bottleneck in the 
servers. The key generating time is directly proportional with the processing 
power of the CPU, so upgrading our hardware can speed up the acquiring 
process. There are several other ways to improve the overall performance of the 
system:  
• Using a dedicated processor for RSA key generation, optimized 
only for this algorithm; 
• Developing a new, or improving the current library algorithm; 
• Introducing a new type of server in our system, this could analyze 
each server’s load and balance the system by sending clients to 
less busy servers. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. Certificate and RSA key generation in time 
 
 
Figure 6. Certificate acquiring time by client 
 
  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
 We implement a middleware platform based on XPCOM components to 
assure different services for platform independent distributed application. The 
proposed authentication protocol as part of the middleware was design to work 
in an insecure environment, supporting message loss, certificate and key 
generation. The implemented protocols have high computational requirements, 
but the proposed distributed architecture of the services can guarantee this.   
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